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Abstract 
The requirement for significantly higher electricity network investment in the UK seems certain 
as the capacity of distributed generation and large scale renewables increases on the system. In 
this paper, which forms a chapter in the forthcoming Book “Delivering a Low Carbon 
Electricity System: Technologies, Economics and Policy” 2 , the authors make a number of 
significant suggestions for improvement to the current system of network regulation. First, they 
suggest that the RPI-X system needs to be overhauled in favour of a simpler yardstick based 
system and which allows for more merchant transmission investments. Second, future regulation 
should involve more negotiated regulation involving agreements between network owners and 
purchasers of network services. This would be particularly advantageous for decisions on new 
network investments. Third, more extensive use needs to be made of locational pricing within the 
transmission and distribution system in order to facilitate the least cost expansion of low carbon 
generation, including micropower. Fourth, consideration needs to be given to ownership 
unbundling of distribution networks from retail supply. This would better facilitate the entry of 
distributed generation and the development of appropriate competition between grid and off-grid 
generation supply and demand side management. Finally, there needs to be a significant increase 
in R&D expenditure in electricity networks supported by customer levies. 
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1. Introduction to the Regulation of Electricity Networks in the UK 
 
Around 30% of the current price of electricity relates to electricity distribution and transmission 
charges. In England and Wales electricity transmission revenue in 2005-06 totalled £1.2bn 
(Ofgem, 2006) while distribution revenue was around £3.1bn (Ofgem, 2004a, p.6). These 
charges are regulated by the electricity regulator Ofgem. In Northern Ireland electricity 
transmission and distribution charges totalled around £0.2bn in 2005-06 (Viridian, 2006) and are 
regulated by the Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation (NIAUR, formerly NIAER). 
There are 15 regulated distribution companies in the UK (though rather fewer independent 
owners) and three regulated transmission businesses in Great Britain (in Northern Ireland 
transmission and distribution are not separated out for regulation). 
 
The introduction of large amounts of renewables (both large and small scale) and gas-fired 
microgeneration into the electricity system necessitates large amounts of new investment in these 
networks. Elders et al. (2006) identify the following technologies as being potentially important 
in future transmission and distribution networks: new power electronics, flexible AC 
transmission system (FACTS), storage facilities (such as compressed air energy storage – CAES 
- and flywheel) and superconducting lines. There may be expenditure on DC transmission cables 
which might be in the form of North-South undersea cables. Future networks will require more 
active management as the intermittency of renewable energy requires increased network 
management to mitigate some of the effects (see DTI, 2006, pp. 210-211). The uncertainty of the 
timing, volume and location of new renewables also makes planning of network development 
more difficult than in the past and has implications for regulation. 
 
Apart from the need for network investment due to the uptake of renewables, new investment is 
needed due to the aging of the existing network. The current transmission and distribution 
network has been constructed mainly in the 1960's and 1970's and many plants are near their 
design life (usually about 40 years) - see Figure 1. The advent of more sophisticated asset 
management, condition monitoring and life extension techniques mean that the plant replacement 
can be delayed (i.e. the investment does not need to follow the lighter (yellow) line in Fig.1) and 
the investment peak of the 1960s is unlikely to be repeated. In that context it is important that the 
plant replacement is not like-for-like but the new plant enhances network security and maximises 
the uptake of renewables. 
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Figure 1: UK Distribution Gross Capital Expenditure 
Source: Scottish Power 
 
 
In the following sections we will discuss the present system of economic regulation of networks 
in the UK and how this may need to adapt in order to facilitate significant volumes of renewable 
energy sources to 2020 and beyond.  
 
2.  Transmission and Distribution Price Control Reviews 
 
Currently transmission and distribution charges are reviewed every 5 years. The last review of 
distribution charges in Great Britain was in 2004 for the period April 2005 to March 2010. At the 
end of 2006 the review of transmission charges in Great Britain was completed for the period 
April 2007 to March 2012. In Northern Ireland transmission and distribution services are 
combined in one company. A review for the period April 2007 to March 2012 was completed in 
September 2006. These reviews determine the level of transmission and distribution charges. We 
briefly characterise the nature of these reviews. 
 
Network price reviews follow a similar format (see Pollitt, 2005). Companies submit detailed 
business plans for the next five years including projections of operating and capital expenditures. 
Capital expenditure plans detail load and non-load related investments and make specific 
reference to proposed major projects. Ofgem/NIAUR review these plans and make initial 
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proposals for price revisions according to the RPI-X formula proposed by Littlechild in 1983 and 
in use in telecoms, gas, airports, water as well as in electricity. The regulatory review consists of 
efficiency studies of operating costs. These are of two types: bottom up - consultant estimates of 
cost categories; and top down – using efficiency methodologies such as corrected ordinary least 
squares. Capital expenditure plans are assessed using engineering consultancy audits of capital 
expenditure plans. Companies can then respond to the proposals which are then revised (once or 
twice) until a final proposals document is published. This final proposals document can be 
appealed to the Competition Commission by one or more of the companies that it covers. The 
process of a price review takes around 18 months and is completed four to five months before 
the new prices are due to take effect.  
 
The regulators are in a position where they decide what level of capital and operating 
expenditure is reasonable and also what the allowed rate of return should be on regulated assets. 
In distribution these three elements represent around one third each of the total regulated 
revenue. Table 1 gives the revenue detail for one of the distribution companies (United Utilities) 
in the recent distribution price control review. The company receives discounted revenue (line 
26) equal to the discounted value of its allowed costs (line 19) which include the five year 
movement in its discounted regulatory asset value (line 6). The discount rate is the weighted 
average cost of capital allowed by the regulator and the discounting ensures that the company 
earns this return. Table 2 gives the revenue detail for National Grid Electricity Transmission (the 
largest transmission company in the UK) from the initial proposals from the ongoing 
transmission price control review. The company receives discounted revenue (line 19) equal to 
the discounted value of its allowed costs (line 14). This discounted cost includes the five year 
movement in its net present value of regulated assets (line 6) and hence compensates the 
company for changes in its regulatory asset base.  
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Table 1 Regulated revenue for a typical electricity distribution utility 
(Source: Ofgem, 2004a, p.127) 
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PRICE CONTROL CALCULATIONS FOR UNITED UTILITIES
2002/03 Prices
2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10
£m £m £m £m £m £m
RAV
1 Opening asset value 920 964.3 1,002.50 1,034.70 1,060.80
2 Total capex 112.7 112.3 111.8 111.4 110.9
3 Depreciation -68.5 -74.1 -79.7 85.3 -90.9
4 Closing asset value 964.3 1002.5 1034.7 1060.8 1080.9
5 Present value of opening / closing 920 825.2
6 Year movement in closing RAV 94.8
ALLOWED ITEMS
7 Operating costs (excluding pensions) 67 64.7 63.1 61.7 60.2
8 Capital expenditure (excluding pensions) 103.5 103.1 102.6 102.2 101.7
9 Pensions allowance 16 16 16 16 1
10 Tax allowance 19.4 22 23.1 24.5 24.5
11 Capex incentive scheme 1.8 1 -0.6 -1.1 -0.5
12 Sliding scale additional income 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9
13 Opex incentive / Other adjustments 1.4 1.4 1.4
14 Quality reward
15 DPCR3 costs 1.5
16 Total allowed items 212.3 209.9 207.5 205.1 203.8
17 Present value of allowed items 206.6 193.6 181.3 169.8 159.9
18 5 Year movement in closing RAV
19 TOTAL PRESENT VALUE OVER 5 YEARS 1006.1
REVENUE
20 Revenue index 1 1.011 1.013 1.022 1.024
21 Discounted revenue index 0.973 0.932 0.885 0.846 0.803
22 Price control revenue 205.2 220.9 223.2 223.7 225.8 226.1
23 Excluded services revenue 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8
24 Total revenue 226.7 229 229.5 231.6 231.9
25 Present value of total revenue 220.6 211.2 200.6 191.7 181.9
26 TOTAL PRESENT VALUE OVER 5 YEARS 1006.1
27 P0 based on the above Revenue (line 22) 7.6%
28 P0 for Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI) 0.4%
29 29
30 Total P0 for comparison purposes 8.0%
31 X 0.0%
Analysis of PO (%):
32 Include EHV 1.5%
33 Exclude metering -1.3%
34 Change in Opex -7.0%
35 Depreciation 7.8%
36 Return 2.7%
37 Rates 1.0%
38 Tax 5.0%
39 Other -1.6%
40 Total 8.0%
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Table 2: Regulated Revenue for National Grid Electricity  
(Source: Ofgem, 2006a, p.95) 
 
 
 
 
Higher volumes of renewables embedded within distribution networks (load related 
microgeneration and smaller scale projects) and directly connected to transmission networks is 
already impacting on economic regulation of networks. The distribution price control identified a 
total capital expenditure requirement from 2005-2010 of £5.7bn (an increase of 48% over the 
previous review period). This during a period when the total renewables share on the system was 
only expected to grow by around 5% of total electrical energy. The growth of capital expenditure 
in electricity transmission is expected to be more substantial growing by 125% over the previous 
price control period to £3.8bn over 2007-2012 (Ofgem, 2006a, p.9). The review also allows for 
adjustment mechanisms which allow for more (or less) capital investment should connected 
generation capacity be greater than the base line forecast (Ofgem, 2006a, b). In addition to this 
investment, an interim review had already allocated an additional £500m of investment 
specifically to allow for extra renewable generation on the system (Ofgem, 2004c). These are 
significant sums of money and include only the beginnings of increased network investments to 
support large percentages of renewables on the system. Future reviews, as our opening 
discussion makes clear, seem destined to involve much bigger increases on the 2005 figures. 
Clearly incentivising least cost network support for renewables is a major issue. As is coping 
with the uncertainty in the development of network requirements in the face of different 
electricity futures (see Elders et al. (2006) and Elders et al., this volume). 
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Minimising the cost of network expansion and upgrade is a major issue for the regulators. The 
distribution price control review introduced a sliding scale system for capital investment 
incentives. The incentives are outlined in Table 3. PB Power were the engineering consultants 
who reviewed the companies capital expenditure plans. The higher the ratio of company base 
expenditure selected to PB Power’s assessment the weaker the incentive if the company actually 
delivered its investment below budget. Thus a company that selected as its base allowed revenue 
the lowest ratio of its cost to PB Power’s estimate could keep 40% of any under-spend while the 
company that selected the highest ratio could only keep 20% of any under-spend. Thus a 
company who estimated that it needed to spend £140m when PB Power estimated only £100m 
was required would have a base target of £115m. If it actually achieved £100m it would receive 
£100m plus an incentive payment of £0.6m. By contrast a company that said it needed £100m 
against PB Power’s £100m and then actually achieved £100m would receive a £100m plus an 
incentive payment of £4.5m. This is a menu of contracts approach 3   to regulation which 
encourages companies to more correctly reveal the true estimated cost of capital investments. 
The transmission price control review has just implemented that a similar scheme for its 2007-
2012 control period (Ofgem, 2006a, pp.96-106). 
 
Table 3: Distribution price control capital expenditure incentive scheme 
Source: Ofgem (2004a, p.87) 
 
 
 
3. The regulation of congestion, losses, quality of supply, visual amenity and noise 
 
Other aspects of economic regulation are also important as we will discuss below.  
                                                 
3 See Baron (1989). 
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Transmission costs have two components: fixed and variable. The fixed component relates to the 
cost of the existing capacity of the grid. As most of the cost of the grid relates to sunk 
investments, the charges for access to it are also fixed and usually they are per capacity (i.e. per 
kW). In the UK, they are termed Transmission (or Distribution) Network Use of System charges. 
If a new generator wants to connect, then it has to pay additionally a one-off connection charge 
which covers the cost of equipment used to connect the generator to the grid. 
 
Actual transmission and distribution charges vary somewhat by location, load and type. They are 
paid by generators and suppliers. For suppliers, they are usually based on the MW load of the 
user during the system peak demand (so called triad charges), For generators, they are based on 
the declared net capacity of a plant. Distribution (DNUoS) charges vary by company area, while 
there are up to 21 transmission charging zones (different for demand and generation) in Great 
Britain. The Transmission Network Use of System (TNUoS) charges are levied per kW of 
capacity according to the imposed value to the system of generation/demand in those areas. 
Figure 2 shows the generation zones and charges in 2005/6.  These charges reflect the marginal 
increase in network flows caused by an increase of generation/demand at a particular node by 1 
MW. They are expressed in MW*km, i.e. they reflect the increase in a flow on a line multiplied 
by the length of the line. The marginal MW*km increases are multiplied by a notional cost of a 
particular line (the so-called expansion constant different for different types of lines and rated 
voltages) and summed over all the lines. Due to the predominant north-south flows in GB, 
generation in the South East receives a rebate, as it causes counterflows, i.e. the calculated 
marginal flows tend to be against the actual network flows. For example a typical 1 GW plant 
located in zone 21 (Peninsula) would receive a rebate of £8 million a year. On the other hand 
generation in the North and Scotland pays extra (see National Grid, 2006, p.4) as the calculated 
marginal flows reinforce the actual network flows. Thus a similar 1 GW power plant located in 
zone 2 (North Scotland) would have to pay £21 million a year. The supplier charges are designed 
such that there are no negative charges for suppliers (demand) as that would create perverse 
incentives to increase demand during system peak (triad charges).  
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Figure 2:  Transmission Network Use of System (TNUoS) zones and charges in GB in 2005/6. Note: zone numbers 
are circled, TNUoS charges in £/kW are the non-circled numbers. 
Source: National Grid (2005) The Statement of Use of System Charges Effective from 01 April 2005, London: 
National Grid 
 
It is recognised that high TNUoS charges could have a detrimental effect on renewable 
development in North of Scotland, where a considerable renewable resource (wind and marine) 
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is located (see chapters by Jamasb, Maratou et al. and by Cust et al.). Consequently there are 
proposals (in mid 2006) for for the Secretary of State to apply a dispensation in TNUoS charges 
‘in a single area of high renewable energy potential’ for up to ten years. Such dispensation is 
undesirable in that it may encourage the location of generation in Scotland which imposes 
inefficiently high costs on the system as a whole. However the subsequent analysis performed 
for the Department of Trade and Industry (Bialek et al, 2006) showed that introduction of a 
dispensation would not have a significant effect on reaching the Government’s 2010 target. The 
main reason for that is that any shortfall in meeting the target would be mitigated by an increase 
in Renewable Obligation Certificate (ROC) price. Moreover, North of Scotland enjoys a 
competitive advantage (even after inclusion of comparatively high TNUoS charges) over any 
other renewable technology with a significant remaining resource. At the time of writing (2006) 
no dispensation from high TNUoS charges has been applied. 
 
Distribution charging follows a different pattern. Until recently, a renewable generator wishing 
to connect had to pay the ‘deep connection’ charge, i.e. the full cost of the necessary distribution 
network reinforcement. From 1 April 2005, a new electricity distribution charging framework 
came into force in the UK featuring a common connection charging boundary for demand and 
generation, the replacement of deep connection charging with a ‘shallowish’ charge, and the 
introduction of generator distribution use of system tariffs (GDUoS) to supplement the costs that 
are not being able to be recovered due to removal of the deep connection charge. The second 
party connecting to the distribution network within the first five years has to pay a proportion of 
reinforcement cost. Ofgem is currently (2006) working on further development of GDUoS 
charges. 4  The objectives are cost-reflectivity, facilitation of competition, predictability, 
simplicity and transparency. There are obvious tensions between some of these principles. 
 
The variable transmission costs are the cost of transmission losses and congestion costs. 
Congestion costs are incurred when there is not enough transmission capacity in the system. In 
the UK, congestion usually occurs on the interconnector between Scotland and England. If that 
happens, the System Operator (National Grid) has to constrain-off a cheaper generation in 
Scotland and to constrain-on a more expensive generation in England. Congestion costs are 
currently recovered uniformly, i.e. non-locationally, from all the generators through Balancing 
Services Use of System (BSUoS) charges. BSUoS are uniform, i.e. everyone pays the same per 
MWh. TNUoS charges are not directly related to congestion although, as expected, there is 
correlation between the two due to North-south pattern of flows The reason for uniform, rather 
than more complicated locational charging for congestion (such as the nodal pricing, practiced in 
                                                 
4 See http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem/work/index.jsp?section=/areasofwork/distributioncharges/edc2
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the PJM market in the US) is that congestion costs are currently relatively small and would not 
warrant an expensive set up and run pricing mechanism. 
 
Power losses are proportionally to approximately square of a power flow in a line. Distribution 
losses consume about 6% of energy produced while transmission losses consume about 2% 
(Ofgem website). There are additional incentive schemes to reduce distribution network 
electrical losses through price review controls.  In 2006 transmission losses are still paid for 
uniformly by all the users (generators and suppliers) despite numerous attempts to introduce 
locational charging for losses.  Depending on the marginal generation connected to the system 
reducing these losses could reduce emissions more or less proportionately to the energy saved. 
Analysis of a recent proposal for locational (zonal) charging for losses has shown that the energy 
loss savings from the scheme would be small, in the range of a few percent of the losses 
incurred, while monetary transfers between generators and suppliers would be more than an 
order of magnitude higher (see Bialek et al, 2004). If marginal charging for transmission losses 
was introduced, generators in the north and suppliers in the south would pay more while 
generators in the south and suppliers in the north would pay less for transmission losses. Some 
generators in the south would even receive a rebate. Thus the overall pattern of charges would be 
to some extent similar to TNUoS charges. 
 
 
There are also incentives to improve network reliability in transmission and to reduce customer 
interruptions and minutes lost in distribution.  In distribution companies can be exposed to 
revenue adjustments of +/- 2% of review for over / under performance against targets on 
reliability and quality of supply (see Giannakis et al., 2005). There are also visual amenity and 
noise impacts of transformer substations and of overhead wires (see Ofgem, 2006). 
 
Ofgem has recently experimented with willingness to pay surveys to establish whether 
companies should be allowed to recover more revenue in order to reduce the local environmental 
impact of electricity assets. More renewables create local amenity impacts within the distribution 
network or create the need for greater transmission capacity requirements to support long 
distance power flows (particularly from Scotland to the South East). Household electricity 
meters currently form part of the regulatory asset base of distribution companies (though this was 
set to end in April 2007) and hence decisions about smart metering still need to be taken by 
Ofgem/NIAUR. Patrick and Hannah Devine Wright discuss this in their chapter. 
 
4. Improvements to the current system of economic regulation 
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A key challenge for network regulation is that incentivising efficient investment in situations of 
uncertainty about the nature of demand growth is not very well understood. Network charges 
have fallen in real terms substantially since privatisation (by around 50% in distribution and 30% 
in transmission per unit of electricity). This has been the result of the strong incentive properties 
of the RPI-X system of regulation combined with pressure to reduce costs and prices via 
significantly positive values of X. However network charges are now beginning to be driven by 
investment requirements. Over 2005-2010 continuing operating efficiency improvements did not 
fully cancel out the requirement for higher investment in electricity distribution while the 
transmission review for 2007-2012 also involves significant price rises due to the substantial rise 
in capital investment. This has already led to calls for the system of regulation to reviewed and 
reformed (see Pollitt, 2005). As the rest of this book suggests there are ways that we can 
incentivise efficient investment in low carbon generation which do provide incentives for this to 
be added at least cost. However network investment in the UK is still largely driven by a central 
planning type of system.  
 
The requirement for large and increasing amounts of regulated investment in networks driven by 
uncertain renewables requires regulators to consider carefully the design of economic regulation 
and whether the current system is fit for purpose. 
 
We want to suggest five areas which Ofgem needs to consider in future. First, the current 
approach to RPI-X regulation needs to be updated. Second, the regulation of new investment 
needs to draw on emerging ideas for ‘constructive’ user engagement from other regulated sectors 
and other countries and incorporating more use of competitive tendering of network investments. 
Third, the issue of locational pricing signals both in transmission and distribution charges 
drawing on nodal pricing concepts in use in the PJM market in the US is examined. Fourth, 
unbundling of networks from retailing - as has happened in transmission - could be extended to 
distribution. Fifth, innovation in networks needs to be encouraged as is beginning to happen in 
distribution with the introduction of the Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI) and is proposed for 
transmission. 
 
4.1 Overhaul of RPI-X 
 
The current system of price reviews makes a clear separation of the analysis of operating and 
capital efficiency. This made sense when companies had very similar mixes of capital and 
operating efficiency or where separability of capital and operating expenditure can be assumed. 
However, it has always been methodologically suspect (see Pollitt, 2005). In addition loss 
incentive reduction schemes and quality of supply incentive schemes have been added on to the 
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basic analysis of cost efficiency rather than incorporated in it. As Giannakis et al. (2005) have 
shown this can lead to perverse results for operating efficiency analysis.  
 
Rapid divergence in technology and investment between distribution company regions, caused 
by the increase of renewables, makes the current approaches to economic regulation increasingly 
open to challenge as they have little underlying theoretical validity. Operating and capital 
expenditure trade-offs need to be encouraged especially where extra operating expenditure can 
avoid large new capital investments and reduce total costs. Similarly projects which significantly 
reduce operating expenditure for modest increases in capital cost need to be properly 
encouraged.  
 
There is also the issue of proper risk allocation between customers and companies. RPI-X has the 
effect of reducing some of the risks on the customer (such as cost risk) but its actual operation 
through submitted business plans and regular revisions shifts much investment risk on to the 
customer. Proper risk allocation should occur. More explicit risk sharing needs to be considered 
such as occurs in US performance based rate schemes (PBR) where companies share risk around 
a central target rate of return (see Joskow, 2005). 
 
Other areas for attention are the length of the current review period. Longer review periods (7-10 
years) would create a more stable environment for investment and innovation. Consideration 
should also be given to the ending of company specific X factors based on detailed comparison 
of own costs against other companies in a UK sample. This can lead to gaming between 
companies (Jamasb, Nillesen and Pollitt, 2004). A simpler ‘yardstick’ system based on average 
costs in the sector may yield better incentive properties and remains to be fully investigated (see 
Shleifer, 1985, and Pollitt, 2005). These changes would be particularly useful for determining the 
revenue related to past investment. 
 
Both DNOs and National Grid have monopolies over the commissioning and operating of new 
distribution and transmission links. The system of regulation guarantees them a fair rate of return 
on approved investments delivered to budget. Merchant (or competitive) transmission for some 
major upgrades may be an option and the regulator should undertake a careful cost-benefit 
analysis of this if it is proposed. However most scenarios imagine that such entirely new and 
potentially competitive capacity is rare (see Elders et al., 2006). However it is possible that 
distinctly new links such as North-South DC cables could be proposed and built by third parties. 
Some links to Scottish Islands, the Netherlands and offshore generation may be built under this 
type of arrangement. 
 
 13
4.2 ‘Constructive Engagement’ 
 
Regulated network investments occur because of the absence of a competitive market for 
network services. However there have been important developments in the creation of negotiated 
solutions to investments between buyers and sellers of network services. The most exciting 
development in the UK is that occurring in airport regulation. Airports exist in a rapidly 
expanding market, require substantial new investment and are subject to significant demand 
uncertainty. BAA owns and operates London’s Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted Airports. These 
airports are regulated by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) which recommend prices following 
price reviews to the Competition Commission. Following widespread criticism of the last price 
review the CAA is pursuing a new approach to deciding its recommended charges (see CAA, 
2004). This involves the CAA chairing negotiations between BAA and the airline users at each 
of the three London Airports in order to negotiate a Price Control Business Plan (see CAA, 
2005). This plan incorporates agreed investments to meet agreed growth targets and has the 
advantage of taking the regulator out of the process of deciding the appropriateness of 
investments. The CAA still has to approve the plan and continue to provide efficiency and other 
studies to inform the negotiations. 
 
Such a plan to involve the users in determining how and when regulated investments should 
occur has been implemented for electricity transmission and sub-transmission in Argentina. 
Littlechild and Skerk (2004a, b) discuss the ‘public contest method’ for determining new 
transmission investments. This method involved users voting on new investment proposals. If 
30% of the beneficiaries of an investment voted against it, it would not go ahead. If 30% of the 
beneficiaries voted in favour of a project and less than 30% against, it would be tendered and the 
cost shared out in proportion to the benefits (subject to a test that the system benefits exceeded 
the cost). Littlechild and Skerk find that this method was successfully adopted for a significant 
number of projects and that a controversial fourth transmission line into Buenos Aires was 
correctly delayed by this process. They also highlight that the compulsory competitive tendering 
of the project and  the use of the winning tender price in subsequent adjustments to the 
regulatory asset base of the transmission company lead to multiple bidders and very competitive 
winning bids. Littlechild and Ponzano (2006) detail a related user engagement process in Buenos 
Aires province (the area around the city) which led to the successful negotiation of a 10-year 
transmission plan (to run from 1999) between the transmission company and more than local 
distribution companies. This paper strongly suggests the practicality of buyer-seller negotiations 
for the deciding of small investments (as part of larger package).  
 
Given the small number of retailers, distributors and transmission companies in the UK such 
negotiated solutions to deciding transmission investments needs to be considered seriously. The 
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UK needs to move away from central planning of such investments and the control of longer 
range planning of the system by National Grid (who effectively control it in Great Britain). 
Serious consideration needs to be given to the competitive tendering of transmission and large 
distribution investments wherever possible as this makes regulation easier. Both of these 
suggestions would greatly extend the role of the market in network investments. 
 
4.3 Locational Pricing 
 
Generation and load investments impose different costs according to where exactly they occur in 
the electricity system. Locational price signals received by generation and loads should reflect 
this. In the UK these locational signals are received through locationally differentiated 
transmission and distribution access charges. However, such signals can be provided via an 
independent system (or market) operator and be decoupled from charges imposed by 
transmission and distribution companies. The issue is whether there is sufficient geographical 
variation in the current charging systems to provide efficient market signals for the location of 
renewables and fossil micro-generation. In transmission there is a zonal system for TNUoS 
charges by kW (not kWh) with 21 zones in Great Britain. Within distribution networks there is 
currently no geographical differentiation of charges. A number of authors have argued for the 
superiority of a full nodal pricing system in the transmission system (e.g. Hogan, 1998). Under 
this system, widely referred to as Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP), charges for congestion 
and losses (as opposed to for capacity) are embedded within energy prices (per kWh) that vary at 
every significant node in the system. As noted above no such charging exists in the UK. The best 
example of this in practice is the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) market in the US 
(now expanded to cover several other states). This market is the largest interconnected wholesale 
market in the world with around 164 GW of capacity by mid-2005. There are 3000+ nodes in the 
system. These provide clear signals for new connection and avoid the averaging problem which 
exists in a zonal system.  In PJM energy prices are recalculated every 5 minutes from bids 
supplied by generators/suppliers. Nodal price differentials recover around 20% of the costs of 
transmission within PJM. Implementing a full PJM type system would be very expensive and 
disruptive to the current system; however a centrally administered system of LMP could be 
administered by the system operator (National Grid) who could calculate nodal energy prices 
from bids submitted to the current Balancing Market.  
 
The current UK system of limited zonal pricing involves averaging of capacity charges across 
zones and no locational variation in energy related charges. This may be important in the context 
of renewables where there are a number of sites where they can be built which may impose very 
different local power flows and require different pattern of system upgrades. Averaging was 
attractive in the early years of deregulation when there was a desire to improve competition and 
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liquidity in the wholesale energy market by having a single energy price across the country. 
However as energy markets build experience and market participants become better informed 
this argument loses force. In contrast to the current situation where nodal marginal transmission 
losses do not vary much around the network (Bialek et al, 2004), they may be higher in the 
future. In addition some evidence shows that nodal pricing may actually mitigate market power 
relative to a zonal system (see Green, 2004) by magnifying the local demand response and hence 
making it less profitable. Other significant markets are moving towards nodal pricing including 
the significant Texas market which is the closest  in terms of overall liberalisation to the UK 
globally (see Adib and Zarnikau, 2006). New Zealand is another market with significant 
experience of successful nodal pricing (see Bertram, 2006). 
 
LMP or nodal pricing requires a detailed model of the system that it is applied to, capable of 
calculating the real time locational prices. This model has to be commissioned and maintained by 
the system operator. It can be a non-trivial exercise and may have significant ongoing costs (high 
in PJM, low in New Zealand). Implementing such a system in the UK would require a major 
change and would be contentious. Any implementation scheme would need to be carefully 
evaluated. The UK currently enjoys a system which has low congestion costs relative to other 
systems (such as PJM).  However, the most advanced electricity markets are moving in this 
direction and large changes to the power flows in the network, coupled with the significant costs 
of upgrading individual lines, may make nodal pricing a sensible option. 
 
Locational pricing is well understood in the context of transmission. However in the context of 
distribution systems it may be just as important. Small-scale renewables connect directly to the 
distribution grid but may also be of more benefit or more cost in particular places. Jamasb et al. 
(2005) propose that the UK should implement a form of locationally differentiated pricing within 
distribution networks as this would properly signal the best places to build new capacity, 
especially at the ends of constrained distribution networks. It would be necessary to build 
detailed models to calculate location varying prices but the benefits would seem to outweigh the 
costs of doing this. At the level of distribution networks zonal differentiation of Distribution Use 
of System charges may be a reasonable initial step which captures much of the benefit of 
locational signalling. Locational pricing within the distribution network might (in the future) 
facilitate the efficient connection of micro-generation and incentivise the installation of smart 
meters and automatic appliance control and battery equipment at the household level. 
 
More finely differentiated locational prices serve the additional purpose of giving clear 
information to the regulator and to the users of the system as to the value of new transmission 
and distribution capacity and form the basis of evaluating where lifting constraints would be 
worthwhile. They can also be used to collect some revenue which can be applied to finance new 
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investments. In the past large-scale generation investments, slow demand growth and more 
predictability in the development of the system over the next price control period made the lack 
of locational pricing signals a minor problem for the UK system. However, more disparate 
generation and demand growth makes getting locational signals right increasingly important. 
Any change would require careful cost-benefit analysis and attention would need to examine the 
relative costs and benefits of alternative systems, some of which might offer less accurate price 
signals but be cheaper to implement.  
 
4.4 Ownership Unbundling 
 
England and Wales provided the world’s best example of effective unbundling of electricity 
transmission from the rest of the electricity system (see Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005, for a discussion 
of this in a European context). The creation of a separately owned National Grid company 
responsible for transmission and unable to invest in other parts of the electricity sector facilitated 
the development of a competitive generation market. This development occurred free from the 
discriminatory access to transmission problems that has plagued other markets which did not 
follow the UK model (in particular Germany). The regulation of the National Grid was made 
easier because it was a separate company and its regulated charges came down substantially as 
efficiency improved (see Newbery and Pollitt, 1997).  
 
The experience in Scotland was rather different. Scottish Power and Scottish Hydro-Electric 
were privatised as bundled companies consisting of generation, transmission, distribution and 
retail assets. In 1991 residential prices were lower in Scotland than in England and Wales but 
now they are higher. An important explanation of this appears to be the failure to separate out the 
transmission function into a separately owned company (see Pollitt, 1999). This problem was 
recognised with the recent creation of an all GB transmission system under the control of 
National Grid. Although Scottish Power and Scottish Hydro still own the transmission assets 
they are now independently operated by National Grid as the single GB wide system operator. 
The result of this change appears to have been a relative lowering of prices in Scotland.5
 
The arguments for clear separation of transmission from the rest of the electricity system are 
based on the theory of vertical integration (see Tirole, 1988). Monopoly parts of the supply chain 
have an incentive to ‘foreclose’ on competitors by imposing unreasonable access conditions in 
related parts of the supply chain in favour of their own divisions in order to drive up margins in 
                                                 
5 Source: David Halldearn (Ofgem) speech on ‘British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements’ June 15, 
2006 available at http://www.iet.tv/technology/power/index.html?page=4
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the competitive parts of the business. This is practically possible in electricity transmission as a 
monopoly transmission company controls the connection and dispatch of individual plants, and 
can be done by increasing connection costs or imposing expensive rules for dispatch on 
competitors’ power plants. Distribution systems in the UK have traditionally been less prone to 
such foreclosure because they are passive rather than active networks. Tough non-discriminatory 
regulation and an initial lack of own generation seems to have been effective in preventing the 
exercise of serious market power in either generation or supply foreclosure. However increases 
in embedded renewables mean that the distribution network is set to change to become more like 
a transmission network: actively managed two way power flows with the potential for own 
generation projects to be favoured over rivals’ projects.  
 
Such transmission and distribution convergence (particularly at higher voltage levels in the 
distribution system) may mean that consideration should be given to ownership unbundling 
between distribution and the rest of the electricity system (i.e. retail (supply) and generation). 
This would have the additional advantage of encouraging competition between on and off grid 
electricity supply as retailers would be separated completely from distribution owners and reduce 
the incentive to favour on-grid solutions. This was a scenario envisaged by Walt Patterson in his 
book Transforming Electricity: The Coming Generation of Change (1999). Such unbundling 
would eliminate the competitive advantage that DNOs currently have over other companies in 
locating distributed generation within their networks. One effect of such unbundling might be to 
increase the value of nodal pricing in distribution as small scale generation could not be added by 
the distribution company with superior grid information but only in response to clear non-
discriminatory price signals. Arguments in favour of this would be strengthened by evidence that 
retail competition might be promoted by the separation of retailers from distribution. The 
evidence for this is limited in the UK but it is the case that switching rates to non-former 
incumbents are highest in the regions where the former incumbent suppliers are not integrated 
with distribution (see Ofgem, 2006c)6. 
 
 
4.5 Innovation and RD&D Expenditure 
 
The high level of investment expenditure in networks required to support large scale deployment 
of low carbon technologies suggests that there is scope for significant technological progress in 
network technologies. However RD&D expenditure continues to be very low in the UK 
electricity sector, suggesting limited scope for new innovation in the sector.  
 
                                                 
6 The five non-integrated regions - Swalec, SWEB, Northern, Norweb and Yorkshire - have a weighted average 
switching rate of 48.7% against 43.5% for the other 9 regions of GB in March 2006. 
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Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) note the collapse in UK energy RD&D following the liberalisation of 
the electricity sector and this also the theme of chapter 3 of this volume. By 2004 the amount of 
money spent by UK network companies on RD&D was very small (less than £4m p.a. or less 
than 0.1% of revenue, see Ofgem, 2003, p.8). The public good aspect of RD&D is significant 
both in generation and in networks given the large number of distribution and transmission 
companies in the UK and globally. RD&D activity also lacks critical mass (with no company 
having any significant in house capability) and is not a strategic priority given the short term and 
regulated nature of expenditure and profitability. 
 
Ofgem have recently explicitly recognised this with the introduction of an innovation funding 
incentive (IFI) (see Ofgem, 2004b). This scheme allows distributors to raise prices by up to 0.5% 
of revenue to fund research projects aimed at improving distribution network performance. The 
recent transmission price control review has extended this to transmission charges (Ofgem, 
2006a, p.66-67). The sums of money involved are small (in total for distribution and 
transmission they would be less than £25m p.a.) but they may be significant in improving the 
rate of technical progress in UK networks at a time when capital expenditure is increasing 
significantly. Mott Macdonald BPI (2004) estimated benefits of the distribution IFI with a net 
present value of £386m on consumer expenditure of £57m. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Electricity transmission and distribution networks are a significant part of the total cost of 
electricity supply in the UK. Large amounts of low carbon generation, particularly renewables, 
will necessitate increased and currently uncertain investment in electricity networks. This is 
already beginning to occur in the latest transmission and distribution price control reviews. 
Although the system of network regulation to 2006 has successfully delivered more investment 
with lower prices, it is not clear that the current system of regulation is fit for purpose in a low 
carbon electricity system. 
 
The importance of electricity infrastructure investment is recognised in the Stern Review (Stern, 
2007). The Review recognises that electricity infrastructure services ‘would change… 
fundamentally’ (p.257). with a significant increase in low carbon technologies – such as small 
scale distributed generation and CHP - in the electricity system. The Review calls on regulators 
to ‘innovate in response to the challenge of integrating these technologies to exploit their 
potential, and unlock the resultant opportunities that arise from shifting the generation mix away 
from centralised sources.’ (p.421). The Review is necessarily silent on the details of what such a 
response might consist of, however this chapter is an attempt to suggest some of the innovations 
in regulation that may be necessary. 
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We have recommended a review of the current practice of RPI-X setting. We suggest new 
thinking in the determination and regulation of required network investments, particularly the 
use of user engagement and competitive tendering. Consideration needs to be given to the 
locational signals inherent in current transmission and distribution pricing structures and whether 
these need to be changed. Ownership unbundling of distribution from the rest of electricity 
system is an issue whose time will come and more thought must be given to the funding of 
increased R+DD in networks given the increasing amounts of capital expenditure involved. 
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